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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 20000278-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.

Priority No. 2

KEVIN R. GRONAU,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State of Utah appealsfromthe District Court Order granting the defendant's
Motion to Suppress. As a result of the Order granting the Motion to Suppress the charge
of Possession of Marijuana in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, a
Second Degree Felony, was subsequently dismissed. This Court's jurisdiction is
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Title 77-18a-l(2)(a)(1999) and Title 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the State's only point of appeal fails to address the issue of whether
or not there was reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify
a second encounter with the defendant and whether their appeal should
therefore be dismissed. It appears the standard of review should be one of a

1

2. presumption of the validity of the lower court ruling similar to those cases
where an adequate record is not perfected. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64.

3.

Whether there was a sufficient show of authority to justify the trial courts
ruling that the second encounter was a Level II encounter, and that the
subsequent seizure was therefore unconstitutional. The standard of review
would be for correctness. State v. Davis, 965, P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah Constitution Art. I Sec. 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was charged with possession of Marijuana with intent to distribute
in the presence of a minor, a Second Degree Felony (R.2). The defendant moved to
suppress the State's evidence that was obtained as a result of a search of the defendant's
vehicle.

On August 27th, 1998 the trial court granted the Motion to Suppress (See
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Addendum A of the State's Appellate Brief). The case was dismissed on March 23, 2000
and the State appealed (R.86).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 16, 1998 at approximately 9:00 A.M. the defendant was pulled over
on Interstate 1-15 at mile post 219 by Trooper Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway
Patrol. The defendant was stopped for traveling 80 miles per hour in a 75 mile per hour
posted zone. (PH pages 6 & 7) (SH 5 & 6).
During the stop there was conversation about a hole punched in the defendant's
drivers license (SH 7-9), but it was determined before the defendant left in his car that the
license was valid. (SH 9-20). There was also discussion about the Hertz rental car the
defendant was driving was one day overdue, based on the return date on the contract. (SH
10-3).
The defendant was driving north towards Salt Lake City when he was stopped.
Mr. Gronau told the officer he had been to St. George to drop his nephew off and was
returning. (SH 8-22)
Officer Mangelson testified at the Suppression Hearing that: "He told me that he
had never been arrested, never been in any trouble." (SH 8-21). The actual conversation
concerning prior arrests was recorded on video and the video is a part of the court record.
At (9:12 A.M. approximately) on the video. On the video officer Mangelson never asked
the defendant if he had ever been arrested. Officer Mangelson said "Have you ever been
in any trouble?" To which the defendant replied "No. I'm not a troublemaker." (See
Video at (9: 12 A.M.). The defendant did at that time acknowledge he got a traffic ticket
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about 3 years before. The defendant did not tell the officer he had been arrested on a
drug charge in 1991.
Officer Mangelson did not observe any marijuana or contraband in the vehicle.
(PH- 21-11) and released the defendant and his vehicle. Concerning the release the
officer testified in the Suppression Hearing starting on Page 10 Line 15, as follows:
"Q. When you said that, were you limiting what he could do,
or was hefreeto do what ever he wanted to do.
A. He wasfreeto do whatever he wanted to do. I simply told
Him, if it come back that he had a criminal history, that I would
contact him. And he needed to use the restroom, and so obviouslyQ. Why would you have contacted him if he had a criminal history?
A. That would have told me that he was lying to me about his criminal
History; and depending upon what that criminal history was for, that I
wanted to go a little bit further.
Q. And why was that?
A. Well, say, for example, it he had a criminal history for auto theft,
it could certainly be one step closer to the fact that he may have stolen
this vehicle. If it was for drugs, then there's a good chance he may be
transporting drugs."
Starting on Page 12, line 1 of the Suppression transcript, the testimony continued
as follows:
"Q. You felt like that if the criminal history came back with something
on it that you would have reasonable suspicion to detain him further?
A. Yes.
Q. And possibly receive a consent to search?
A. Yes.
Q. But you didn't feel like you had enough to detain him at this point?
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been made because nothing happened between the In M en^^mer and the second
encounter that would give reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the second
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encounter. The State in its brief did not even address the issue of the impact of the
dispatcher's message of a 1991 arrest.
2. The State argues in its brief that there was no seizure prior to the dog sniff of
the car and that the uncommunicated intentions of the officer are irrelevant. Defendant
contends that there was an illegal Level II stop and as a part of that stop there was a
substantial show of authority by the officer and a communicated statement that he was
going to call for the dog to sniff the car. Therefore the car was not free to be driven
away by the defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE, IN ITS APPELLATE BRIEF, HAS FAILED TO
EVEN ADDRESS THE BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
IN THE SUPPRESSION ORDER.
Point 1 in the State's brief argues two issues, both of which relate to the factual
matters involved after the second encounter between the officer and the defendant. The
basis of the Trial Court's actual ruling was set forth very explicitly in the last two
paragraphs of the "Ruling" portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Although the
entire decision is reproduced in the Addendum to the Appellant' brief, the critical portion
that we rely on for this argument is reproduced as follows, but with emphasis added:
"Officer Mangelson claims that he had a reasonable suspicion to seize the
vehicle because Gronau lied to him about his previous criminal history.
However, the facts, including the video, show that Officer Mangelson asked
Mr. Gronau, 'Have you ever been in any trouble.' To which the defendant
replied, 'No. I'm not a troublemaker.' Assuming, arguendo, that Gronau
did lie about his criminal history, i.e. a drug arrest in 1991 and a traffic ticket
in 1995, this does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Therefore, Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify the second encounter with Gronau or to seize his personal
property.
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Due to the fact that Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable,
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the vehicle was wrongfully seized and
the subsequent search pursuant to the Search Warrant was unconstitutional.
Therefore, all evidence discovered during the search must be suppressed."
I\>r purpose of this appeal the defendant does not conieinl ilui ills' initial stop for
speeding 8u w.

nt
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granted the Motion to Suppress, the States appeal should be dismissed
POINT II
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AND REQUIRED A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
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A

called the officer. The officer then pulled into the restaurant parking lot at a 90 Degree
angle behind the defendants car. He confronted the defendant and told him about the
1991 arrest.

The officer also told the defendant he suspected the defendant was

transporting drugs and wanted to search Mr. Gronau's car. Mr. Gronau told him no.
The officer also testified that at that point he did not have enough to detain Mr.
Gronau but that the car could not go.
The State argues that because the officer did not specifically tell Mr. Gronau that
the car was "In Jail" that his uncommunicated intent was not a seizure.
The factual situation in this case is very similar to Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d
274, (2000). In that case Ray was effectively seized because the officers were retaining
her papers. Although she may have been allowed to walk away and leave her papers
behind she did not have to do that. In this case the State is saying Mr. Gronau could have
got in his car and driven away because the officer did not say to Mr. Gronau that the car
was seized. The standard as recognized by this Court and a set forth in Salt Lake City v.
Ray, (supra at 277) as follows:
"Hence, a level one encounter becomes a level two stop and a 'seizure
under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in view
of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave."
As set out above and in the Statement of Fact there was a substantial show of
authority by the officer which the State ignores in its brief. There is one other factor the
state ignores which is absolutely critical. When Gronau said no to the search the officer
said "Well, what I am going to do is I am going to call Alden Orme, a Nephi City dog
handler and I will have him run his dog around the car." (Addemdum A Transcript Page
14 line 23) The State cannot reasonably contend the defendant was free get in his car and
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leave when the officer informed the defendant that the dot", Imrullei was going to be called
to have the car sniffed
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suppressing the evidence on the grounds that the c\ :• i.
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14

\

i

-•

•

J

-

••

>r -

. .i to the U. S. Constitution, and .Article I Sec,

Jtah Constitution .
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d;:v of December, 2000

H:DON SHARP, ATTTOB&JEY FOR APPELLEE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee by first class
Mail, on this 13th day of December, 2000, to:
Scott Keith Wilson
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 So., 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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A.

Going west and pulled into the south side of

Milkelson's Cafe .
Q.

Where is that in Nephi City?

A.

Yes.
As he stepped out of the vehicle, I pulled in

on about a 90-degree angle to the way his car was
parked, and I confronted him with the information that I
had gotten back from dispatch.
Q.

What did you say to him?

A.

I told him that dispatch had advised me that

he had a drug arrest in 1991; and I told him what my
suspicions were, that I suspected that he was
transporting narcotics.
Q.

And what did he say?

A.

He got very hostile and told me that I was

harassing him and that type of thing.
And I said, "Well, do you mind if I check
your car? "
And he said, "No, you are not going to search
my car."
breakfast.

He said, "Me and my boy is going in and have
You can do whatever you want, but you are

not going to search my car."
And I said, "Well, what I am going to do is I
am going to call Alden Orme, a Nephi City dog handler;
and I will have him run his dog around the car."
Utah District Courts
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And he said, "Do whatever you want.

We're

going in for breakfast."
Q.

Was the defendant free to leave at this

point ?
A.

He was.

Q.

Had he gotten in his car and traveled down

the freeway, would you have detained him further?
A.

Well, when I say the defendant is free to go,

I'm not saying that his car was free to go.

I was going

to obtain a search warrant for the car, and eventually
that's what I did.
Q.

But was the defendant free to go?

A.

He was free to go, yes.

Q.

And what happened after you had this exchange

with him?
A.

He and his son went in the cafe.

know what they did.

I don't

I assume they got some breakfast.

They was in there for 25, 30 minutes.

I had the dog

handler come out, and he ran the dog around the car, and
the dog alerted on the trunk area of the car.

He

scratched the paint off the rear bumper.
MR. SHARP:

I'm going to object to him

testifying as to his conclusions concerning the dog.
The dog handler is apparently here and -THE COURT:

He can testify to what he
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